Abstract-External storage devices, such as USB-Sticks, SDCards, or other flash memory devices, are widely used today. These devices may pose a threat if they contain sensitive data and are then lost or forgotten somewhere. Usability of existing encryption solutions for such external storage media is limited because of the need to reenter keys or authentication credentials every time the media is plugged to a different device. We present a solution to the usability problem by caching the key with time delayed deletion. We implemented two variations of this concept. One solution does not require any explicit user interaction, thus limiting the use of the external storage device to short term data transfer, only. The second solution allows multiple encryption keys for different files of the file system to be managed on a trusted host, using the timed key caching to avoid handing out keys or passwords.
INTRODUCTION
External mass storage devices, such as USB-Sticks are small in respect of their physical dimensions and are large in respect of their capacity of up to several gigabytes. They pose a threat for corporate networks, as they are used to transfer arbitrary data, including confidential corporate data and then potentially get lost. It is in companies' vital interest not to lose sensitive corporate data that way. On the other hand, these devices are quite useful and ease daily office work when files are to be shared among colleagues or project partners when no network is easily accessible. Forbidding the use of external storage media is one way to address the issue but it is not adequate. It is more convincing to keep the flexibility of using these devices while securing the content on them at the same time.
There are different solutions that deal with encryption of the content of external storage media. Some require proprietary software, which is to be installed on the machine which is used to access the medium. Others use additional hardware tokens containing cryptographic keys to perform encryption and decryption, which can be removed and ought to be carried around separately from the storage medium. The risk is that these tokens easily can get lost or that users do not keep access token and storage device separate. Other external medium hardware relies on biometric authentication, usually by having a fingerprint sensor included. Some biometric sensors can be circumvented with little effort [18] and some of these products do authentication based on the PC software that comes with the medium and have no authentication on the medium itself. For details see Section VII.
Usability is an important property of a security solution. The easier it can be used and the less the user can do wrong when using it, the more likely it is that the level of security promised by the solution is indeed achieved. If the user has to follow an exact procedure to configure or handle the solution properly, there is the risk that wrong configuration or wrong handling lead to insecurity while continuing to feel secure. The desired solution should be usable to gain user acceptance. At the same time, it should be secure. Thus, it should fulfill the following requirements:
• The encryption and decryption scheme should be transparent to the user and to the operating systemno additional software should be needed to access the data on the storage medium. Existing drivers for mass storage media that come with today's main stream operating systems should be reused as they are. Users should be able to just read and write data without having to take extra care of encryption and decryption. Not requiring additional software allows, for instance, use of the external storage medium to share data between project partners of different companies, each of which may have different rules about which software is acceptable to be used on their corporate computers.
• The authentication mechanism should allow one host to read or write user data while a different host can be used to transfer encryption keys to the external media. This reduces the attack surface for sniffing attacks aimed at revealing a user's authentication credentials.
• Authentication should not require user interaction every time the external media is attached to a host. This would greatly improve usability.
• The solution should be self contained in that it does not require a user to have a separate device with him.
• Furthermore, the solution should aim at reducing the number of passwords a user has to remember. The contribution of this paper is twofold. We present usable key handling for external media by timing the expiry of keys. We also present an external media capable of transparently encrypting a FAT based file system without operating system support. It is possible to have multiple FAT file systems on the same device dynamically sharing storage space, each protected by a different key. The prototype implementation shows the feasibility of these concepts. This paper is structured as follows: We describe in Section II our simple solution that offers security in case the external medium is used to transfer files for short periods of time only. Section III introduces the concept of an external storage medium which allows more advanced key management. How to encrypt the data in a file system on the medium is described in Section IV. Issues on key management are discussed in Section V First experiences with an implementation are presented in Section VI. Security considerations on our contributions are covered in Section VII. How this work relates to other work is presented in Section VIII. Section IX concludes this paper.
II. SIMPLE SECURE EXTERNAL STORAGE MEDIUM WITH
ONE ENCRYPTION KEY The goal of the secure external storage medium design is to combine security (i.e. data confidentiality and secure key management) on the one side and usability (i.e. easy to use and transparent encryption) on the other side. The use case seen for the simple external storage medium is to share files among colleagues or business partners (for example in a meeting). If the storage medium is accessed after the meeting or if it is forgotten in the meeting room, unauthorized users cannot access the data. This use case together with the requirements from Section I guided the design.
The secure external storage medium contains all the components an external storage medium usually is equipped with: such as non-volatile memory and an interface, such as USB. In addition, it contains a key store that can store keys which are used to encrypt and decrypt data while being written or read to or from the medium. There is a timer on the medium that starts running when the medium is unplugged. Power supply is contained to enable the active components (timer, key manager) to be operated when the medium is disconnected. The keys have a lifetime. The timer triggers their deletion upon expiry. In order to store encrypted data on the medium or to decrypt stored data to be read, keys need to be created and stored on the medium. Each block of the non-volatile memory is encrypted by the key stored in the key store on the external medium.
When the secure external storage medium is attached to a host for the first time, it auto-generates a key that is stored in the key store and never leaves the external medium. Any data that is written to the external medium by the host is encrypted and stored on the non-volatile memory in encrypted format. Any data that is read is decrypted and forwarded to the host. When the external medium is unplugged, the timer starts running. If the external medium is attached to any host within a predefined time frame, the key is still available and data can be read and written. If the predefined time frame has elapsed before the external medium is attached to any host, the key is deleted from the key storage and data stored on the external medium is no longer accessible. When the external medium is attached to any host again, a new key is created and a new file system is written to the non-volatile memory. The external medium appears like a freshly formatted storage medium to the host.
As the design of this external storage medium is simple, use cases are limited to data sharing within short time frames only. The advantage of this architecture is its easy usability. Compared to ordinary external storage media, the user only has to keep in mind the predefined expiry time frame and that data is lost after this time frame has expired. The user does not have to deal with key management and authentication. No software is to be installed on the host for accessing or maintaining the medium.
III. SOPHISTICATED SECURE EXTERNAL STORAGE MEDIUM WITH MULTIPLE ENCRYPTION KEYS
Using the secure external storage medium in a more flexible way requires a more complex architecture with additional hardware components in the secure external storage medium. It is desired to have multiple keys to encrypt different data with different keys. Each key should have its individual expiry conditions. Also, deletion and recovery of keys should be possible. The envisioned use case is to transport data from one place to another (e.g. while being on a (business) trip), where the keys are not available on the external medium while being on the move, but are available at the destination.
In addition to the simple architecture, this external medium has an encrypting file system that manages to encrypt data clusters using different keys. For fulfilling the transparency requirement (see Section I), no additional communication with the host is used to organize encryption and decryption. This is done by the encrypting file system (described in Section IV) without involving the host. Creation and provision of keys and configuration of availability conditions is also not done with the host to fulfill the transparency and security requirements. Instead, one specialized host (the so called trusted host), which, for example, can be a PC or a mobile phone, is prepared for this purpose. The external medium is either attached to this trusted host prior to being used with any other host, or the external medium is equipped with an additional interface which is used to contact the trusted host while being attached to any other host (see Section V for more details on key management).
IV. ENCRYPTING FILE SYSTEM
In the previous section we introduced a secure external storage medium which is used in this section to deploy the encrypting file system there.
Recall the requirement that encryption and decryption shall be transparent to the user and that no additional software ought to be installed on the hosts from which the storage medium will be accessed. These requirements force us to define an encrypting file system that does not require additional commands in the command set of main stream interfaces to access external storage media, such as USB mass storage device class [1] . There is also no way to communicate with the file system driver of the operating system. The file system on the external storage medium is independent of the host the storage medium is attached to.
Because the File Allocation Table ( FAT) file system, defined by Microsoft [2] is supported by all main stream operating systems, it is chosen as a basis for this work.
In the case an application writes data to or reads data from an external storage medium equipped with our encrypting file system, two intelligent components deal with the data: the file system driver of the operating systemwhich is the ordinary FAT driver -and the interceptor of the external storage medium (see Figure 1 , which illustrates write access). Given the fact that the interceptor only 'sees' the commands that are issued by the file system driver, the interceptor does not get an overview of what the file system driver is doing in order to read or write data and to keep consistency of the file system. The file system driver's commands are of the form: "write data to block#", or "read data from block#". The only chance of the interceptor to perform encryption and decryption of data on the fly is to deal with that kind of commands as the only information the interceptor gets.
In the rest of this section we define an encrypting file system that copes with the above mentioned restrictions and performs encryption and decryption of data stored on the external storage medium, by keeping the file system's consistency. We propose three solutions that differ in terms of usability and complexity.
A. Solution 1 -One Active Key
In the first solution, there is only one key active at a time. It is used for reading and writing. All blocks on the storage medium are encrypted. Different keys can be used for different files at different times. The file system that is visible to the operating system is a virtual file system which is generated by the interceptor. When a new key is created on the external storage medium, a number of blocks is allocated to this key. At any time, only those blocks are accessible which are allocated to the currently active key and appear to the host as a contiguous set of blocks. All the blocks that are not allocated to the currently active key do not appear in the virtual file system to the operating system. The block interceptor (see Figure 2 ) performs the mapping between logical and virtual blocks, as well as encryption and decryption. To the operating system the content of the storage medium appears different depending on the chosen key. The active key is chosen on the trusted host. Multiple keys can be stored on the storage medium but only one of them can be active. 
B. Solution 2 -One Partition per Key
This solution enables multiple keys being active at the same time. For each key, a partition of the available storage space is assigned. Partitions are contiguous sets of blocks defined in the partition table by their starting block and length. The host's operating system reads the partition table and usually presents to the user individual partitions as if they were independent drives.
Depending on the active keys, the external medium creates a virtual partition table that is presented to the host. For every read or write operation, the data is encrypted or decrypted using the appropriate key depending on which partition is being written to or read from. The external storage medium can map partitions and therefore keys to a read or write operation by checking which block is being accessed by the host 1 . The basic concept behind this solution is the same as of solution 1 (see IV.A). The only difference is that we have multiple keys of the solution 1 type active at the same time, accessible from the host by different partitions.
C. Solution 3 -Dynamic space allocation for multiple keys
This scheme allows multiple keys to be used within the same partition. However, only one key within a partition can be active at any one time. The basic idea is to use one FAT (File Allocation Table) which is shared by all keys. For each key that is used, a different root directory is assigned. This is achieved by mapping the root directory belonging to the selected key from a memory area not accessible by the host into the blocks that are normally assigned to the root directory. This mapping is done by the block interceptor according to Figure 2 . Presenting a different root directory per key ensures that only files encrypted by this key are presented to the user via the host's file system. There are no links to files not encrypted by this key in the root directory or any of its subdirectories. The file system will not overwrite clusters encrypted with a different key, because these are marked as used in the FAT which is the same for all keys. The layout of the entire external media is depicted in Figure  3 . 
1) Data Structures and Definitions
The encrypting FAT file system consists of the following data structures.
FAT: the file allocation table as specified in the FAT16/32 specification. It is a unidimensional array that has as many fields as there are clusters (= sequences of blocks) on the file system. The position of a field in the array represents the corresponding number of the cluster in the file system. The value of a field stores the number of the cluster that is the next one that belongs to a file or directory on the file system if a file/directory exceeds the size of a cluster. There are special entries for the fields that mark the corresponding cluster as last cluster of a file (0xFFF8) as 1 Unfortunately, not all operating systems support multiple partitions on a removable USB storage device such as USB sticks well as entries that mark clusters as free (0x0000). Clusters contain the data stored on the file system. # _ # : cluster subsequent cluster FAT → KAT: the key allocation table stores the key used to decrypt/encrypt the content of a cluster. Like the FAT, the KAT is an array, where the position in the array is the number of the corresponding cluster. The value of the field is the identifier of the key which is used to decrypt/encrypt the corresponding cluster. The key identifier and the corresponding key itself are stored in the KT. # # : key cluster KAT →
KT:
The active key is stored with its corresponding unique identifier and its metadata, e.g. expiry conditions. The trusted host used for managing all keys keeps a list of all keys in use in this medium together with their identifiers. key key KT → # : Key: the key is created on the external storage media initiated by the user. It is used to decrypt and encrypt clusters. It is a symmetric cryptographic decryption/ encryption key. Only the key that is available for encryption and decryption at a time is stored in the KT. The others are not on the external medium.
Cluster: the sequence of a predefined number of blocks that is the smallest amount of data that is read from or written to a file or directory in the file system in a read or write operation. ) ( # :
2) Read Request
When the host sends a read request for a certain block to the storage medium, and the block is in the encrypted part of the medium, i.e. not the partition table or FAT (see Figure 3) , the storage medium returns the content of the block decrypted with the active key. This operation is expressed as follows:
) 
3) Write Request
Writing data to the file system consists of two subsequent operations. When the host sends a write request, including the block number and the data that is to be written, the data is encrypted by the active key and stored (operation (1) below). The index of the key used for this block is stored in the KAT (operation (2) below). The operations are: :
Cluster#(block#) returns the cluster number that the block being accessed belongs to. Therefore, our external media understands the file system structure.
For both read and write operations, the active key is known because it has been selected previously and it is constant until the external media is detached (see Section V).
4) Freeing space occupied by lost keys
In case a key is lost, the root directory and subdirectories encrypted by this key cannot be accessed anymore. To identify clusters occupied by files and subdirectories encrypted with this key, the KAT is used. As the KAT stores the last key that was used to encrypt a cluster, all clusters marked as encrypted by the lost key can safely be marked as free in the FAT.
Losing the key refers to the situation where the user does no longer have the key on his trusted host. The operation FreeSpace is triggered by the user via the trusted host in such a case.
V. KEY MANAGEMENT
To create keys and to choose the active key on the external media, communication with the external media that goes beyond ordinary file system drivers' and mass storage device class drivers' features is needed. The transparency requirement of Section I does not mandate software that deals with key management on every host. This makes sense as it is desired not to be required to prepare the host the external media is attached to in any way. Thus, the concept of the trusted host has been introduced. The trusted host has specialized software which is used to perform key management and maintenance. In order to provide a usable external media, the trusted host should be a host that can be easily accessed by the user, but not by other persons. A PC, a PDA (personal digital assistant), a mobile phone, or a (corporate) server are possible examples.
In this paper, we propose two possibilities for management of permanent keys which we consider, without experimental verification, as the most usable ones.
In the first possibility, keys are managed by a trusted host. The trusted host is a host that has special software installed that is used to manage the external medium. The external medium supports commands via its interface used for host connection (e.g. USB) that are used by the management software. All the hosts not having the software installed can be used for reading and writing data as far as keys allow. As mentioned above, the trusted host could, for instance, be a mobile phone. The advantage of a mobile phone is that the user usually carries it and can provide keys while being on the move. The external media could be configured so that it deletes all keys immediately after it has been detached from any host except the trusted host. Whenever the external media is to be accessed again, keys have to be uploaded from the trusted host to the external media again. An expiry time (as proposed for the simple solution in Section II) instead of immediate deletion would be an alternative as well. The trusted host is also used for user authentication to protect the keys, as it has a user interface.
The second possibility described here is to add a second hardware interface to the secure external storage medium that is used for key management. This interface can be, for instance, a serial interface (e.g. USB), a mobile network interface (e.g. for GSM or 3G) or a Bluetooth interface to connect a mobile phone. When the external medium is connected to a host, the second interface is used to set-up a connection to a service which negotiates with the external medium which keys the external medium is permitted to download. Various conditions can be specified by which the external medium can receive keys stored on the service. Once the external medium is detached from the host, keys are deleted. When it is attached again, new negotiations take place. Centrally administered access control to keys on the service is possible with this scenario which may be particularly interesting for corporate use cases. The end user does not have to keep the keys on a trusted system, nor does the end user have to manage keys, as these can be centrally administered. They are safely stored on the server providing the service. Typically, proper authentication and a secure communication channel are set-up to protect keys. Instead of adding a second interface to the external media, it is also possible to combine the secure external storage medium and the mobile phone in one device, as both can use the same hardware components, such as processor, timer, memory, and (USB) interface. The mobile phone would gain the additional feature of an external media being controlled by the phone's user interface and/or the centrally administered service.
Of course, key management is not limited to these two. For both these possibilities, the mobile phone is particularly suitable. As the user carries it all the time, it can be accessed easily. This trusted host concept may be combined with the time delayed expiry.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
The simple solution of Section II and solution 3 of Section IV.C have been implemented on a development board to learn about the overhead in terms of additional storage required and in terms of performance loss due to the computational overhead. A hardware crypto-module has been used to perform fast encryption and decryption. This section discusses observations made with the implementation.
All implementation was done on an ATMEL AT91SAM7XC256-EK evaluation board. The microcontroller contains an ARM7 core and is run at 48MHz. Built-in features of the controller that we use include a USB controller for communicating with the host, a serial peripheral interface (SPI) controller for communicating with an SD card as flash memory, AES hardware encryption, and a timer 2 . We used a 256MB SD card as flash memory. A 4.5V battery pack is used to buffer the timer.
We first implemented the simple solution outlined in Section IV.A to understand better the microcontroller and the performance impact encryption will have on data storage. The multiple keys solution of Section IV.C was the second implementation.
The implementation is approximately 3500 lines of C code. The size of the compiled image of the application is about 32kB. Performance of the system is such that including encryption increases both read and save times by 0.25%. The read and write speeds achievable by our prototype are in effect bound by the SPI and USB speeds attainable by the microcontroller.
As expected, the secure external storage medium works with Windows, Linux and MacOS X.
In first tests with peers trying out the solution, we could observe high usability of the concept. However, the formfactor of the evaluation board doesn't allow real usability tests yet. One tester commented: "This is like a floppy disk that is always formatted when you need it".
The second implementation was done to understand the impact of key management on the usability of the concept. In this implementation, a trusted host runs an application that loads a key onto the secure external storage medium. Now, all data that is written to or read from the medium is encrypted or decrypted with this key. Again, this key has a timeout associated with it. Transfer of the key is in clear, thus the communication path between trusted host and external storage medium is also considered trusted. The implementation of the application on the trusted host is written in Visual Basic and has approximately 500 lines of code.
As was to be expected, whenever a new key is selected, the USB medium has to be reread by the host, because operating systems tend to cache contents of the root directory. Forcing rereading in our implementation was implemented by disconnecting and reconnecting the USB connector.
First usability tests showed that the added functionality (namely being able to recover data after a key expired) of the second solution comes at a price: one has to remember which key is used for what purpose.
The implementation shows that encryption and decryption have a surprisingly low overhead -both, USB and SPI interface incur a much greater load on the microcontroller.
VII. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
For the attacker model underlying this work we distinguish two types of attackers: there is a casual attacker who finds the external media after it has been lost by the rightful owner. There is also the directed attacker who takes further steps to get access to the data on the media.
We protect against the casual attacker (similar to e.g. Bitlocker for Windows Vista [24] ) and against the directed attacker who steals the media after the timer has expired. A directed attacker however could also, for example, replace the external media by one that does not encrypt the data or install a shim on the USB interface, which redirects all data stored on the device to e.g. a wireless interface. The root cause for this is that it is not possible to implement authentication of the USB device to a host which is not the trusted host due to the transparency requirement. Additionally, tamper proofing of the media would add high additional manufacturing cost.
Another avenue of attack would be that an attacker poses as legitimate user of the external media and thus gets hold of it while the timer is not expired. The attacker then installs malicious software on the USB drive while it is not under control of the owner. If the owner plugs the device back into her computer before the timer has expired, the malicious software will still be readable and can go about its malicious activities.
The casual attacker could perform a cryptographic attack on the ciphertext found on the external media. To counter this, AES counter mode seeded with the block number of the block written to or read from is being used.
Furthermore, there are no integrity checks performed on the encrypted data. Adding integrity checks would be possible, at the expense of some performance loss and of some storage space to store an authentication code per sector. Adding this would be straightforward. It is deferred to future work.
VIII. RELATED WORK
There is a small body of academic publications relating to encryption of storage media. Some work considers encryption of file system such as CFS [19] , CryptFS [21] , NCryptFS [20] . These works describe file system drivers that encrypt all files being read or written to. In contrast to our solution, with these file systems it is possible to encrypt individual files using different keys. However, installation of the encrypting file system on the host that is intending to access the file system is necessary, which is something that we try to avoid.
Naturally, there are different ways of transferring the key to the external media. While we opt for temporarily storing the key on the device, other solutions would be to use biometrics such as fingerprints. The obvious problem with this is that the fingerprint is most likely found on the case of the external media itself, as the user will have handled it, with potentially disastrous consequences for data confidentiality [18] . Furthermore, an accompanying device always worn by the legitimate owner could be used for credential entry [22] . This idea could easily be combined with time delayed expire of keys. The drawback of this wearable tokens is that they have to active all the time, i.e. they require regular charging of their battery.
In contrast, there is a vast variety of products that are capable of encrypting user data. Some products are hardware based, others are software solutions. None of the products found address all the problems solved by our solution. Either, the products are not transparent to the operating system, which results in the need of specific software, which is often only available for one or two operating systems, or authentication is to be performed via the host the external medium is attached to.
A.
Software encryption solutions: Numerous software solutions exist. There is general purpose encryption software, which can among others be used to encrypt files, virtual partitions and logical partitions (e.g. PGP [7] , GnuPG [23] ). Specialized for disk drives including removable medium are disk encryption tools. Some of the tools are designed for any drives (e.g. [4] , [5] , [7] , [9] , [17] ), others (e.g. [10] ) are shipped with hardware (e.g. with USB sticks). The difference between the latter two is mainly the software licensing model.
B.
Hardware encryption solutions: Hardware encryption solutions at least have an encryption engine implemented in hardware (e.g. [11] ). Some also allow the key to be stored on hardware that can be removed (e.g. Cipher Shield Realtime Encryption). Some allow the key to be unlocked based on biometric data, i.e. fingerprint scans (e.g. [12] , [13] , [14] ).
IX. CONCLUSION
We presented a concept for external storage media that allows transfer of files but automatically enforces data hygiene by making data unreadable after a certain time of being removed from a host. The purpose of this is to defend against a chance attacker happen to get hold of the external media in case the rightful owner looses it. This concept is realized by automatically encrypting all data. We implemented two prototypes to be used for different use cases: one in which the external media is only used for short term data transfer, and one in which the data is protected in transit, but can be recovered for use with any device after the external media gets rekeyed by a trusted host.
In order to allow files to be encrypted transparently under different keys while sharing the same storage space required reconstructing the file system inside the external storage media. We were able to show that automatic encryption even for low powered devices such as USB external flash media incurs only minimal overhead. From first experiences we can report that simplicity in usability seems to trump features for such single purpose devices. This seems to be the case even for a feature considered essential, such as the ability to store data on external media for an extended period of time. A formal usability test is relegated to future work. Likewise, in the future, we will try to evaluate how our work can be adapted to file system types offering a higher performance than FAT file systems.
